1. 1.Spread of Turkish military UAVs
In recent years, the activities of Turkish military drones, especially UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), have attracted the attention of military personnel and the media.
The Turkish government has spent nearly 20 years since the latter half of the 1990s striving to improve the domestic industrial base for the development and production of domestic UAVs. The result was the emergence of the main aircraft in the latter half of the 2010s, and from 2016, in the process of intervening in the Syrian civil war, in 2020, it showed an activity that influences the battlefield in Libya and Azerbaijan, which are export destinations.
So far, there have been articles reporting the activities that Turkish UAVs have shown in each battle, but comprehensive information on the ideal state and future of Turkish military UAVs, including the construction of national strategies and industrial bases related to domestic UAV development. No consideration is found.
Looking at the UAV development process and government documents so far, it can be seen that Turkey has continued its consistent development efforts in collaboration with the government, military and private companies under a certain national strategy. Analyzing the background of the activities of Turkish-made UAVs reveals the instability of future development trends as well as the fact that Turkey as a UAV powerhouse could not be established overnight.
2. 2.Domestic UAV development history
It is said that interest in drones increased within the Turkish government around the end of the Cold War. From the mid-1990s to the 2000s, although efforts were being made toward domestic development, it was heavily dependent on imports such as GNAT750S (1995) manufactured by General Atomic of the United States and Heron (2005) manufactured by IAI of Israel. It was a system that was established.
Such an import-based system will later shift to a domestic-made system, and the cause is pointed out by the effects of arms embargoes by Western countries. Since the Cyprus conflict that broke out between 1973 and 1974, the US embargo on Turkey has continued, and later, due to disagreements over the Iran nuclear agreement and the influence of human rights diplomacy, imports of the latest weapons such as the RQ-9 Reaper. Became more and more difficult. On the other hand, in relations with Israel, which was another major importer, the balance with relations with Arab countries was always an issue, but the Gaza Freedom Flotty Incident in May 2010 (Turkish NGOs, etc. in the Gaza Strip). For the fleet established for the purpose of humanitarian assistance, the Israeli army developed into a battle with the fleet that resisted when attempting an inspection, and nine fleet members died in the battle). As a cause, diplomatic relations deteriorated rapidly, and it became difficult to import from here as well.
Other factors that prompted the shift from the import-based system include the fact that the initially imported aircraft could not meet the required performance because it was technically immature, and there were concerns about dependence on overseas military technology. It has been pointed out.
As a result of these factors, Turkey will focus on domestic production of military drones from the end of the 2000s to the beginning of the 2010s. Already in 2005, Baykar-Makina's Baykaraktar-Mini prototype was developed, and in 2010, Turkish Aviation Industry (TAI)' s Anka prototype was developed. Is extremely limited in terms of performance, and the latter crashed in 15 minutes during a test flight, making aircraft development difficult.
However, while repeating these failures, the munitions industry improved the performance of the drone, and finally in 2014, Bayraktar TB2 (BayraktarTB2), which is the main machine of Baikal Makina, was delayed, and in 2016, TAI was anchored. Completed the development of S.
Even after the development of the main aircraft that meets the military requirements, the cruising range and attack capability of UAVs have been improved, and USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles), UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles), and UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicles) have been developed. Technological development by the domestic military industry, such as the development of weapons: Unmanned Ground Vehicle), continues to develop to this day. Figure 1 summarizes the development status of domestic drones such as UUVs, USVs, and UGVs as well as UAVs in chronological order. Figure 2 summarizes the specifications of major domestic military UAVs, including the aircraft currently under development.
[Fig. 1] Main development chronology up to the end of 2020 [Note 1]
[Fig. 2] List of major UAVs developed in Turkey [Note 2]
3. 3.National strategy for domestic production
Turkey has been guiding and supervising the civilian munitions industry after clarifying the direction of development and the intended use for the full-scale development of military UAVs. The direction that Turkey is aiming for is "Türkiye 0054nsansız Hava Aracı Sistemleri Yol Haritası 2011-2030" ("UAV System Roadmap 2011-2030" announced by the Defense Industry Secretariat (SSB) in December 2011. , Hereinafter referred to as "roadmap").
First, the government recognizes that the military use of UAVs will expand globally and that investment in UAV-related technologies can bring enormous benefits to Turkey. On top of that, in order to promote domestic production through strategic resource investment and to form a common understanding among related parties, we will deal with a wide range of areas such as private UAV use and international rule formation, centering on military use of UAVs. There is.
For military UAVs, as shown in Figure 3, the method of defining the form of UAV to be developed from the two aspects of the required mission and the system that constitutes the UAV, and setting the development target year. I'm taking it.
In addition, as medium-term (10 years) technological development goals, the development of self-diagnosis and self-repair functions of the systems that make up the UAV, ensuring a high degree of autonomy, and improving interoperability with other weapons are long-term. The goal of (15 years) is to build the self-learning and independent decision-making ability of AI installed in UAV, and the goal of the final year is to develop an unmanned aerial vehicle.
[Fig. 3] Classification and development goals of military UAVs on the roadmap [Note 3]
Turkey thus had a fairly comprehensive vision at the time of full-scale domestic development. However, as far as 10 years have passed since the formulation, it cannot be seen that the achievement status of the goals listed in the roadmap is being evaluated and reviewed.
In addition to the roadmap, SSB formulates a "Stratejik Planı" ("Strategic Plan") once every five years, which also sets UAV development as one of its goals. After the roadmap was formulated, the 2012, 2017, and 2019 editions have been published, but as shown in Figure 4, the content is abstract and does not help evaluation.
[Fig. 4] UAV development goals described in the Strategic Plan [Notes 4, 5, 6]
In this way, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the achievement status of the target directly from government documents, but the following evaluations are possible due to the current state of development trends.
First of all, regarding fixed-wing aircraft, considering the performance of the developed Anker S and Bayraktar TB2, the development up to System 5 as shown in Fig. 3 has been completed, and System 6 is about to be deployed now. It is presumed to be the situation. Of the aircraft under development, TAI's Axungle seems to fall under System 6, but the target year of 2018 has been exceeded, and it can be seen that development is not proceeding as planned.
As for rotary-wing aircraft, small UAVs such as Kerg and Seruche have been reported to be active, but the development trends of UAVs that fall under systems 11 and 12 have not been made public, and the current situation is unknown.
It is speculated that the altitude, speed, and cruising standard used in the roadmap for definition are unknown, but it can be seen that although development is progressing as a whole, there is a delay from the initially set target.
Four.Popularization of military drones and operation on the battlefield
Despite doubts about its consistency and progress, Turkey has undoubtedly succeeded in developing a domestic military UAV, an operation carried out in northern Syria to intervene in the Syrian civil war since 2016. It has been put into actual battle on a large scale.
In 2016 Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), the number of UAVs deployed was small, and as a result of developing operations mainly by ground troops, as the battlefield shifted to urban warfare, it became muddy and suffered great damage. .. Based on this experience, the 2018 Operation Olive Branch (OOB) 2019 Operation Peace Spring (OPS) will advance the UAV and eliminate obstacles to ground troops. The operational policy was established.
The Operation Spring Shield (OSS), which started at the end of February 2020, showed the best results of such an operation method. Immediately after the operation was launched, a large number of UAVs attacked the Syrian army, and then the ground troops invaded at an electric shock speed, which attracted the attention of military personnel around the world. The front became stalemate after that, but by completing the operation in a short period of 12 days, it succeeded in minimizing the damage.
OSS is a rare case in which a large number of UAVs collaborate with other services in large-scale conventional battles and produce great results in a short period of time. UAVs have not been used in military operations in the past, but the scale, speed, and results of OSS have had a great impact on military personnel in each country, and this is the birth and expression of a new military doctrine. There were some theorists who did.
However, as discussed earlier in another article ("Operation Spring Shield-The State of the War in Turkey, a Drone Powerhouse-" Advanced Technology Security Institute HP), although the scale of UAVs used in OSS has increased, The usage and operation of UAVs have not changed qualitatively from previous strategies. At different scales, there is no significant difference in the missions they engage in when compared to other cases where UAVs have been used in military operations.
In addition, one of the arguments claiming the birth of a new doctrine is that some argue that the size of the battle result by UAV is mentioned, but it is not limited to the case of the Turkish army, but accurately grasp the battle result of UAV in the battle between regular armies. It's extremely difficult to do. In the turmoil of the battlefield, it is necessary to grasp the number of defeats by UAV alone, and it is also necessary to record the battle results for each model.
In this way, there are many unsolved issues even when using the results of UAV warfare as a basis. In any case, the author's idea is that these reasons alone cannot fully answer the question of why a new doctrine was born in this operation [Note 7].
Five.Export of military drones and impact on international affairs
As confirmed in the previous section, the activity of Turkish UAVs in Syria has been widely touted through the media, but there is ambiguity that the results of the war have not been quantitatively and strictly proven. However, despite its ambiguity, the image of an effective weapon has affected demand for Turkish UAVs and is gradually expanding exports.
Figure 5 shows Turkey's UAV export status from 2010 to 2020, which was registered in the database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Looking at this, it can be seen that the market is expanding not only to the Middle East and North Africa regions such as Libya, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, but also to the Caucasus and the Black Sea coastal regions such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan. From the beginning of 2021, it is reported that countries such as Morocco and UAE are also considering importing UAVs from Turkey.
[Fig. 5] Turkey's domestic drone export status (2010-2020) [Note 8]
Figure 6 shows a comparison of Turkey's UAV exports from 2010 to 2020 with the situation of the United States, Israel, and China's major UAV exporters during the same period. Looking at this, it is clear that Turkey's UAV exports are small compared to other major powers, but in terms of export destinations, there is no duplication or competition except for a small part such as UAE. It can be seen that they are segregated.
[Fig. 6] Comparison of UAV exports in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus [Note 9]
For now, Turkey has no intention of changing its policy of expanding UAV exports and will seek to further expand its market to the Middle East and North Africa. Israel and Iran, as well as the United States and China, are actively exporting UAVs among the Middle Eastern countries, and the expansion of Turkey's exports will accelerate competition with these countries. In addition, the expansion of UAV exports carries the risk of pouring new oil into the fire of regional conflicts.
Although not in the Middle East, unfortunately UAV exports have already sparked conflict and have an impact on the region's international affairs. That is the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that began in September 2020.
In the Second Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, the Azerbaijani Army, which imported and used Israeli and Turkish UAVs, overturned decades of inferiority to Armenia and achieved great results, part of the Nagorno-Karabakh region that was in dispute. Succeeded in regaining.
As shown in Figure 6, on the SIPRI database, the number of UAVs imported by Azerbaijan is overwhelmingly Israeli, and the number of Turkish ones is small. However, in this conflict, Turkey combined not only the UAV aircraft but also the related equipment and skills necessary for military use of the UAV, such as facilities for controlling the UAV from the ground and training of UAV pilots. Exports and provides.
It is similar to the case in the previous section in that it is difficult to quantitatively grasp the results of the UAV, but if the Turkish UAV played a decisive role in the conflict as reported, it will continue. Turkey's influence in providing aircraft, related technologies and know-how will be greatly expanded.
Already in December 2020, Ukraine has decided to significantly increase imports of Bayraktar TB2 following the consequences of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. If the export of the drone itself is to be expanded and related technologies, operational know-how, tactical ideas, etc. will be provided, there will be a conflict between Turkey, which aims to expand its influence, and the importing country and the regional powers that have influence behind it. It will cause and will eventually bring a new impact to the international relations of the region [Note 10].
6. Can Turkey keep its momentum?
So far, we have confirmed that Turkey has established a system for domestic production of UAVs, which has had great influence in each aspect of military, economic and diplomatic aspects. Turkey's UAV development has so far progressed relatively well, albeit with some delay. However, from the progress so far, the existence of uncertainties regarding future UAV development has become apparent.
For example, issues that need to be resolved in order to maintain the momentum of development, such as the dependence on overseas technology revealed by the embargo by the Canadian government after the fall of 2020 and the outflow of human resources seeking high wages and favorable environment to Western countries. Is gradually becoming clear.
The development period targeted by the "roadmap" is about to return. Whether Turkey can overcome these uncertainties and further develop and accelerate UAV development will have a considerable impact on international political developments in the Middle East and Central Asia.
[Note 1] Created by the author based on various materials
[Note 2] Created by the author based on various materials
[Note 3] SAVUNMA SANAY וו MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, “Türkiye 0054nsansız Hava Aracı Sistemleri Yol Haritası 2011-2030,” SAVUNMA SANAY וו MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, 2011.12 (confirmation date: May 22, 2021 2017/10 / SSM_% C4% B0HA_Sistemleri_Yol_Haritas% C4% B1_2012.pdf
[Note 4] SAVUNMA SANAY0054 Sanayii-Mustesarligi-2012-2016-Stratejik-Plani.pdf
[Note 5] SAVUNMA SANAY וו MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, “Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017-2021 Dönemi Stratejik Plan,” 2017.3 (confirmed date May 22, 2021) https://www.ssb.gov.tr/Images/Uploads/MyContents/F_2017 .pdf
[Note 6] TC CUMHURBAŞ KANLIĞI SAVUNMA SANAY וו MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, “STRATEJוK PLAN 2019-2023,” TC CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI SAVUNMA SANAY0054 MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, 2019.11 (confirmation date 2021) /MyContents/V_20191204150841743368.pdf
[Note 7] Junpei Makita, "Operation Spring Shield-The appearance of the war set by the drone powerhouse Turkey-", Institute for Advanced Technology and Security, 2020.11.2 (confirmation date: May 22, 2021) https: / /www.giest.or.jp/contents/reports/mj20201102.htm
[Note 8] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (confirmed date May 22, 2021) https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
[Note 9] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
[Note 10] Junpei Makita, "International Relations and Drones over Nagorno Karabuff-Great Game of Turkey and Russia-", Institute for Advanced Technology Security, 2021.1.28 (confirmation date: May 22, 2021) https: //www.giest.or.jp/contents/reports/mj20210128.htm